GrowCRGO
Dear fellow shareholders,
On February 23, 2026, the board declared 2026 a "transition year,"5 indicating that it was willing to give up on growth this year ("deliberately sequencing our growth")5 in order to scrape an EBITDA breakeven by year end, rather than becoming breakeven and then profitable through growth. They also announced a pivot away from the Platform segment (marketplace or transactional revenue) toward Solutions (mainly SaaS), exactly at the time when the whole world was realizing how SaaS businesses are threatened by AI. I announced my resignation from the board of the company I founded that same day.28 By the closing bell the stock had fallen another 30%, and it has never recovered.29 The market, it seems, read the announcement as I did.
Some background. The current chairman was appointed in July 2025, announcing a "next chapter."2 What was the nature of this new chapter? The public record suggests that this same board was already de-emphasizing growth in the second half of 20254,27 β a change of course as dramatic as February's is rarely conceived overnight. It became explicit on February 23, 2026: "deliberately sequencing" growth out of 2026.5
So the board chose to sacrifice the company's Platform vision and growth ambitions in order to reach EBITDA breakeven (not profit or positive free cash flow, just EBITDA breakeven) by an arbitrary date. Thirteen months into the chairman's tenure, growth has indeed stalled, and the stock is down 62%.18 Yet no consequence has reached the boardroom: the chairman and every director who adopted what I regard as a misguided strategy, and presided over the downturn and share-price fall that followed, still sit today.7 The only one who resigned is me. Instead it is we shareholders who are paying the price.
Let's take a step back. I led Freightos for fourteen years, from an idea in 2012 to a Nasdaq-listed platform trusted by the world's largest carriers, freight forwarders, and importers. I certainly made my share of mistakes along the way. But the model worked: we grew revenue every year, and between 2023 and 2025 we grew revenue by 45%, cut the adjusted EBITDA loss by 41%, raised IFRS gross margin by 8.6 percentage points, increased revenue per employee β all through growth.15 Growth decelerated only in the second half of 2025 β the current chairman's first months, when, as the public record suggests, the board's de-emphasis of growth was probably already under way.27 The right response to a slowdown is to fix growth. Instead, on February 23, 2026, the board gave up on it.
There is a right way and a wrong way to reach breakeven.
The right way is the one my team always practiced: grow revenue, expand margins, hold expenses close to flat, and let ~70% non-IFRS margins carry you to breakeven and immediately afterwards to growing positive profit and free cash flow.
The wrong way is to cut costs and neglect growth. This is wrong for at least three reasons. First, without growth, and with the company down to a skeleton executive team, how do you even progress from barely EBITDA breakeven to highly profitable free cash flow? Let's face it, none of us invested in Freightos because we're excited to own a subscale, roughly EBITDA-breakeven, ~$30m/year company, with approximately zero real growth at the end of 2026.24 Second, shareholder value: according to Meritech, the market pays roughly three times the multiple for a similar result reached through growth.23 That is the multiple this board traded away. Third, in a winner-take-all platform business, a year of standing still is a strategic gift to competitors: an open invitation to become the dominant platform in our place.
I've never heard of the board of a growth-stage company
taking a sabbatical from growth.
Further, in my view, the pivot to Solutions-first puts Freightos on the wrong side of AI. SaaS-shaped software β the very shape of Solutions β is precisely what AI agents are beginning to commoditize: workflow that they can increasingly do themselves. On the second-quarter call the company reported "some pricing pressure on renewals"14 in Solutions. This is likely the beginning of what AI does to software pricing, one of the reasons I was against the Solutions-first pivot. What no AI agent can replace is the neutral marketplace β the network of carriers, forwarders and importers, the live tradable prices, and the rails to actually execute a booking. AI agents will need the Freightos Marketplace even more than human freight professionals do, and the board chose this moment to deprioritize Platform.
Even the transition year's own promises have not been delivered. In February, the company announced the "shift to a Solutions-first strategy."6 In May, the CEO reported optimistically that "we are seeing a stronger commercial momentum in our solutions pipeline."9 But then in August, the company announced that Solutions revenue β the very segment the pivot was made for β fell 4% year on year, down 7% in real terms.12,19 And at that time, in August 2026, with Solutions revenue now shrinking, the company attributed the shortfall to "the execution gap identified during 2025."14
In the meantime total revenue grew just 3% year on year β zero in real terms last quarter.19 When a board deliberately "sequences" growth out of a year, a total stall is exactly what it gets. Nor has the promised "operational discipline"6 shown up: gross margins remain below their Q3 2025 peak.15 EBITDA improved towards breakeven, as it did in previous years, which matters, but whereas in previous years it improved primarily through growth, much of this year's improvement is the false economy of losing critical talent (see The facts). Bottom line: zero real growth, in what is supposed to be a subscale growth company with a stated model of 25β30% revenue growth per year.10
A transition year has to transition to something.
What about the future? The company promises a return to "Growth of 25-30% per year"10 in 2027 following EBITDA breakeven in 2026 (although on the Q1 2026 call they hedged that with "20% plus growth trajectory" for 2027).9 I see nothing in place to deliver even 20%. In our industry, growth is built the year before: leaders hired, products launched, pipeline filled. Yet entering September 2026, the offices of CMO, CRO and SVP R&D still stand empty,17 and the baseline real growth is zero. What exactly is in place to deliver the promised 2027 growth? That is one of fourteen questions I have put to the board. And a stall is not easily reversed: companies that stop growing rarely start again. McKinsey's study of some 3,000 software companies is titled, simply:
"Grow fast or die slow."25
This board has chosen the second half. A word, then, about why I am launching this campaign. I'm not a confrontational person and it particularly pains me to publicly criticize the board of the company I founded. That's why I stepped down quietly from the board in February28 and stayed silent for over six months, preferring to raise my acute concerns with the board privately, which I did on several occasions, to no avail. Then, after second-quarter results that showed growth all but stopped, and third-quarter guidance weaker still, it became quite apparent that the 2026 strategy is failing and that shareholder value is being destroyed β the very result I resigned over in February.28 And yet the board is still refusing to course correct. At this point it would simply be wrong for me to maintain silence.
A shareholder intervention is imperative.
To emphasize, I have no argument with the team at Freightos β they are excellent, and always have been. Many are friends. In my view it is the board's strategy that has given an alarming number of the best execs and managers a reason to leave in 2026.17 The talented people who remain are working hard and deserve a board that shares their ambition, and a strategy worth staying for.
I'm launching this advocacy because Freightos is the biggest project of my life β and because the opportunity is as large as it has ever been if it's not squandered. But time is running out. International freight is still in the early innings of digitalization, and Freightos remains the best-positioned company in the world to lead it. But that lead is slipping. And because I care about you, my fellow shareholders: many of you invested after hearing the Freightos pitch from me personally. What's missing is a board that believes in our vision β starting with the chairman.
So I'm asking you to support three changes, set out in The plan: a new chairman who has built technology growth companies; directors' terms shortened to the standard one year26 so the board answers to us; and through the board changes, a recommitment to building a highly profitable company through aggressive platform-first growth, starting with a rebuilt team relaunching the Freightos Marketplace for the AI age.
These are not just proposals. On July 8, 2026, I put them to the company as three formal resolutions for this year's AGM, exercising a right the articles give every one of us: to bring business before our own annual meeting.11 In my view a board concerned with upholding shareholder rights would confirm the vote. This board's first reply, twenty days later, instead listed the grounds on which it might "omit" or "exclude" the resolutions, starting with whether I qualify as a shareholder.11 I do not believe a board concerned with our shareholder rights writes that letter.
More than sixty days and a letter from my Cayman counsel to every director later, the board finally committed to consider the resolutions on or before November 4.11 The articles required me to give the company 120 days' notice. November 4 is day 120. Three resolutions do not take four months to review. It seems the board is running down the clock so that we shareholders have no time to enforce our rights.
A chairman and board that expect to win our vote
don't work this hard to avoid it.
For now, this site asks one thing: whether or not you agree with me, register your email. Then, when the moment comes to vote for change β and I will fight to uphold our right to that vote β you will hear from me and make your own decision. And if you have thoughts on Freightos' future, write to me at my email address β I will read every message with an open mind. You can also try sharing your views with the board via Freightos investor relations .
Freightos doesn't belong to the board. It belongs to us.
Zvi Schreiber September 9, 2026
Founder & Shareholder,
Freightos
The facts
Drawn from the company's filings, earnings calls, and market data.
Board decisions β coinciding with Zvi's board resignation
On the Q4 2025 earnings call of February 23, 2026, management announced a "shift to a Solutions-first strategy" β reordering the company's priorities away from the platform.6
The company framed 2026 as a "transition year"5 of "deliberately sequencing our growth"5 β their words. On the Q1 2026 call the CEO put 2027 at a "20% plus growth trajectory" β below the "Growth of 25-30% per year"10 the current investor deck still carries, though he cited both figures on that call.9
Promised in February: a "shift to a Solutions-first strategy" and a stage where "operational discipline and execution focus must increasingly complement our strong foundation."6 Delivered by August: Solutions revenue down 4% year on year,12 and IFRS gross margin of 67.6% against its Q3 2025 peak of 69.1%.15
25β30% growth in 2025β203016
"β¦our fast-growing platform revenues will become the dominant part of our revenue"1
1β2% year-on-year growth guided for Q3 202612
"shift to a Solutions-first strategy"6
The shift to Solutions-first (primarily SaaS) came just as AI began to threaten SaaS business models.
What followed in 2026
Q2 2026 revenue of $7.691M beat the company's own guide of 0% to β3%8 β and is still a record by only $19,000 over the $7.672M of Q3 2025, three quarters earlier. Year on year that is +3%3 β with inflation at 3.4%, roughly zero real growth.19 Q3 2026 is guided to +1% to +2%.12 The company's own model is 25β30% a year.10,16
β62% β the decline from US$3.34, the opening price on July 28, 2025, the day the current board chairman was appointed, to the current price. Over the same period the Nasdaq Composite has risen +25% from its opening level of 21,176.40. Relative to the index, CRGO has lost ββ70% of its value.18 Fallback numbers as of campaign launch.
Departures this year, for whatever reasons, include the CMO, CRO and SVP R&D & Data, and several director-level leaders. There is barely an executive team β the offices of CMO, CRO and SVP R&D have been empty for months.17 The one executive hire of 2026 we know of is a CFO, effective September 1.13
The numbers behind it
In Q2 2026 the Platform the board deprioritized grew 19% to $2.9M, while Solutions β the segment the whole pivot was made for β fell 4% to $4.8M, roughly 7% in real terms.12,19 Solutions revenue peaked at $5.1M in Q3 2025 and has not grown in any quarter since: $5.1M β $4.9M β $4.8M β $4.8M.15 Every dollar of the quarter's growth came from the strategy the board stepped away from.
Adjusted EBITDA is guided to β$6.9M to β$6.4M for 202612 β a midpoint of β$6.65M, ahead of the 2023β25 trend of ββ$7.3M. It is the one line ahead of trend. But that trend carries an acquired loss: Shipsta, bought in August 2024, lost $698k in its first four and a half months20,21 β of the order of $1β1.5M a year. Take it out of both ends and 2026 lands on the old trend, not above it. And what improvement there is comes from cost, not growth β unfilled executive seats among them.17
Platform transactions still grow β but the rate has slowed sharply. Q1 rose +25% year-on-year in 2025 (296k β 371k) and only +15% in 2026 (371k β 425k).15
Full quarterly and annual figures, charted, with every source listed: see the numbers.
The questions
Every one rests on something the company published itself, and every one can be answered in a sentence or two. They were sent to Freightos investor relations; the full list, with sources and a status for each, is on the questions page.
The current investor presentation says revenue growth of 25β30% a year from 2027; the CEO says "20% plus." Which is the target?
If there is a playbook for 20β30% growth, why was it not run in 2026 β when most of every extra revenue dollar would have reached the bottom line?
The 20-F names a director as not independent, yet he holds no disclosed role at the company. What makes him non-independent?
The plan
Freightos is a technology marketplace in a vast industry. Its board should be led by someone who has built and scaled technology growth companies β and who measures success in market leadership, not in managed decline. A couple of other board changes will also be required, and we need to change the directors' term to a standard one year.26
Task the board and management with growing the platform β the segment that is working, the segment shareholders invested in, and the asset best defended against AI disruption. That starts with relaunching the Freightos Marketplace, backing it with the investment it deserves and aligning it strongly with AI. Solutions are valuable, and should be expanded, but as a complement to the Platform, not a substitute for ambition. At ~74% non-IFRS gross margins,12 platform growth is also the surest road to profit.
Set a strategy worth staying for. Stem the loss of senior talent and make Freightos a place where the best people in freight technology want to build the industry's future.
The more shareholders who are informed and paying attention, the harder the current course is to sustain. Registering commits you to nothing. It simply means you'll hear directly when there is something to decide. Register your email.
The numbers in full
Four years of the company's own full-year figures. The last bar in each chart is 2026 as the company itself guides it (or, for margin, the reported first half), set against the trend the three prior years had established.
The full-year picture, 2023 β 2026
Reported full year Β· 2026: company guidance (revenue, EBITDA) or the reported first half (both margins) Β· 2023β25 trend, extended to 2026
The quarter-by-quarter picture, Q1 2023 β Q2 2026 (all reported)
Revenue rose every quarter from Q1 2023 to Q3 2025 β then stalled. Q2 2026's record $7.691M is just $19,000 above the $7.672M of Q3 2025, three quarters earlier. Platform transactions kept growing the whole way, so the revenue that stalled is the non-platform "Solutions" revenue the new strategy is built on.
$7.7M in Q3 2025, then $7.4M β $7.2M, and back to $7.7M in Q2 2026 β a record, and +3% on Q2 2025, against the company's own 25β30% model.10 Q3 2026 is guided to +1% to +2%.12,15
Platform volume kept rising β a record 458k in Q2 2026, up 15% year on year, with gross booking value a record $422M, up 33%. Volume up while total revenue is flat: Platform revenue grew 19%, so the shortfall is Solutions, down 4%.12,15
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